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I. Introduction 
Young innovating companies constitute risky investments because 
they lack the necessary track record and often lock their capital in 
intangibles.1  Entrepreneurs wish to secure some financial backing in order 
to grow their business; but, while they know their business inside-out, 
potential investors must be convinced to invest.  To defeat information 
asymmetries,2 entrepreneurs and potential investors must rely on 
observable characteristics or other manufactured signals to make 
investment decisions.3 
While these innovative startups are ill-suited for bank loans,4 they are 
prime candidates for venture capital (VC) fund investments.5  To elect their 
investments targets, VCs rely on characteristics and signals that can be 
observed before and during the negotiations.  For instance, before the 
negotiations, potential investors valorize the prior experience and education 
of a fund-seeking entrepreneur;6 or during negotiations, an entrepreneur can 
 
 1.  Bronwyn H. Hall, The Financing of Innovative Firms, 1 R. ECON. & INSTITUTIONS 1,   
2–5 (2010) (discussing how innovative companies have most of their assets in research and 
development (R&D) and this R&D constitute an intangible asset, mostly in the form of human 
capital). 
 2.  Id. at 7.  Information asymmetries were first formally discussed by George A. Akerlof 
in The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUARTERLY J. 
ECON. 488 (1970) where he describes how market with information asymmetry may lead to good 
investments to not enter the market. 
 3.  Hall, supra note 1, at 8 (using the example of R&D expenditure as a signal around the 
information asymmetry problem). 
 4.  “Low salvage values relative to the original investment makes these [intangible assets 
created by innovation investment] unsuitable for debt finance in spite of the tax advantage, so that 
firms whose investments are mostly intangible will rely more heavily on retained earnings and 
equity.”  Id. at 10.  Citing previous empirical studies, Hall, supra note 1, argues that young 
innovative companies are often cash strapped, this lack of cash affects R&D, and they rely more 
on venture financing because they are more willing to take risks.  Id. at 21–22. 
 5.  ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF 
INNOVATION, 10–13 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the type of companies in which venture capital 
funds invest). 
 6.  David H. Hsu, Experienced Entrepreneurial Founders, Organizational Capital, and 
Venture Capital Funding, 36 RESEARCH POL’Y 722 (2007), David H. Hsu empirically tests 
whether prior experience and education affect the fund receives through direct ties as well as the 
valuation of the venture.  He finds that prior experience has a statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of receiving funds through direct ties as well as increases the pre-investment valuation 
of the company.  He finds, however, that education has mixed and sometimes inconclusive 
effects; yet, in the Internet industry, holding a doctorate increases the likelihood of receiving 
funds through direct ties as well as increases preinvestment valuation in a statistically significant 
way. 
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reveal her company’s potential if she is willing to accept staged financing7 
or relinquish some corporate control.8 
When investing, VCs also consider company characteristics such as its 
innovative potential.  Investors seek innovative companies because 
innovations can help them profit based on Schumpeterian principles.9  
These principles argue that innovation helps generate profits in one of two 
ways: innovation helps create differentiated products or innovation helps 
produce the same product but at a lower cost.10 
Investors struggle to assess innovation potential.11  First, investors do 
not fully observe this potential because inventors do not wish to disclose 
their innovation.12  Second, even if inventors clearly disclose their ideas, 
entrepreneurs also have an incentive to exaggerate their potential.13  
 
 7.  Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a venture capital market: lessons from the American 
experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003).  Ronald J. Gilson explains how contracts between 
venture capital firms and startup entrepreneurs can be used to alleviate some of the risk, 
uncertainties, information asymmetries, and agency cost linked with the investor-investee 
relationship including using staged financing, control, monitoring, etc.  Stage financing falls 
within this category.  Id. at 1080. 
 8.  Id. at 1091. 
 9.  “[T]he bulk of private fortunes is, in capitalist society, directly or indirectly the result of 
the process of which innovation is the ‘prime mover.’”  Joseph A. Schumpeter, BUSINESS 
CYCLES, A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST 
PROCESS, 104 (1939). 
 10.  Id. at 85–86.  Innovations shift the innovator’s cost curve and allow innovators to 
capture some of the demand. 
 11.  This issue does not refer to the difficulties measuring innovation or innovation potential 
because innovation is an abstract concept.  This issue refers to the observation of innovation 
potential because innovators know more about their inventions than outside observers. 
 12.  Disclosing innovation makes it available to potential competitors because ideas and 
innovations are non-rival and can be reproduced.  The “non-rival character of knowledge . . .  
means that once an invention is known, everyone can use it with no additional R&D cost.”  David 
Encaoua, Dominique Guellec & Catalina Martínez Patent systems for encouraging innovation: 
Lessons from economic analysis, 35 RESEARCH POL’Y 1423, 1424 (2006).  This issue is referred 
as the Arrow’s information paradox where disclosing the information destroys its value. 
KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) (explaining the paradox that the information’s “value 
for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it 
without cost”).  The investors may not copy the information herself but the innovator may not be 
able to prevent its reproduction after disclosing it.  The initial inventors may still enjoy a first-
mover advantage and hence benefit from her invention, but she might not be able to benefit as 
much as she would have, had she not disclosed. 
 13.  Mattew Beacham & Bipasa Datta, Who becomes the winner? Effects of venture capital 
on firms’ innovative incentives: a theoretical investigation, Univ. of York, Working Paper (2013).  
Mattew Beacham and Bipasa Datta present a two-period theoretical model explaining the 
incentive that entrepreneurs have to put high amounts of efforts in the first period in order to 
obtain venture capital financing in the second period. 
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Therefore, investors struggle to forecast the market potential especially at 
the early innovations stages. 
Fund seeking companies and investors rely on selection criteria that 
address information asymmetries and separate companies according to their 
potential.  In the software industry, entrepreneurs and investors have 
arguably used patent portfolios to separate companies according to their 
potential.14 
Patents are perceived as incentivizing innovation by granting the 
holder a monopoly in exchange for disclosing information about the 
invention;15 however, in the software industry, patents do not seem to fulfill 
this function.16  The software industry moves too fast for the patent system 
and for the innovator to profit on her monopoly power.  This is because a 
patent takes on average of almost three years to be granted,17 while most 
software users would have changed software at least once during that time 
period.18  Even if software patents remain relevant, its holders have hardly 
enforced them.19 
Software patents instead are often used as innovation-potential signals.  
Software startups rarely hold patents.20  This scarcity makes them good 
 
 14.  Ronald J. Mann, Do Patent Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 961 (2005). 
 15.  Catherine M. Cottle & Robert P. Greenspoon, Don’t Assume a Can Opener: 
Confronting Patent Economic Theories with Licensing and Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 194, 205 (2011) (discussing the reward theory of patents that “argues that 
patents incentivize innovation by increasing the benefits associated with obtaining a patent” 
because it creates a monopoly market that the innovator can exploit). 
 16.  Id. at 209–10 (discussing the prospective theory and how patents disseminate 
information such as declaring to competing firms of successful research and allowing holders to 
exchange information). 
 17.  Performance Accountability Report 190 Table 4 (2013), USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2013PAR.pdf.  This table shows that the average pendency for a 
Computer Architecture, Software & Information Security was 2 years and 8 months. 
 18.  The lifespan of software has been dropping quickly.  A survey from 1992 cites a 10.1 
year lifespan for software in Japan. Tetsuo Tamai & Yohsuke Torimitsu, Software Lifetime and 
its Evolution Process over Generations, SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE PROC. 63 (1992).  “Another 
survey in Germany from the year 2000 claims that more than seventy-five percent of customers 
are replacing their software each year and almost fifty percent are replacing them every six 
months.”  Sylvain Perchaud, Software Patents and Innovation, 1 J. OF INFO. L. & TECH. (2003). 
 19.  Mann uses his interview with IBM to explain how some companies have a more 
“lenient enforcement of their IP rights.”  IBM offers nonexclusive licenses and does not wish to 
enforce its intellectual property through litigation.  Mann, supra note 15, at 1005–06.  This seems 
to indicate that the cost of enforcing patents outweighs the benefits in the software industry.  
Software innovators often prefer to cross-license their patents. 
 20.  For instance, in a 2005 survey, a minority of software startups held patents by the time 
they received their first round of venture capital financing.  In comparison, in the biotech industry 
the majority of companies held a patent before receiving their first investments.  In Patents, 
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signals.  Software companies often file patent(s) later in their lifecycle to 
differentiate their products, to facilitate cross-licensing, and to signal 
expertise and knowhow.21  First, this paper analyzes whether patents have 
been used as innovation-potential signals as well as how they help investors 
select which projects to finance.  This paper argues that VC funds have 
indirectly encouraged the proliferation of software patents. 
Patent scarcity also makes startups vulnerable to potential claims.  A 
2013 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted an 
increase in patent infringement litigation with multi-defendants between 
2007 and 2011 and 89 percent of this increase was attributable to software 
patent litigation.22  Second, this paper analyzes how the impact in the 
increase in patent litigation affected the software industry and the signaling 
value of patents.  The second section also discusses how Patent Assertion 
Entities (PAEs) have proliferated, how PAE litigations have increased, and 
how they impact the value of patents. 
Both VCs and PAEs rely on patents in different ways.  By using 
patents in an unexpected way, PAEs have complicated VCs’ company 
valuation.  Indirectly, VCs have fed into the patent assertion entity 
problem.  This paper presents empirical evidence that PAEs have impacted 
the behavior of VCs.  Finally, this paper discusses how VCs have been 
impacted by PAEs and the role that VCs play to hinder the PAE 
phenomenon.  This paper argues that VCs can do more to hinder the impact 
of PAEs. 
II. Are Patents Good Signals for Investors? 
On the demand side, most young companies rely on inside finance to 
start their businesses but in order to grow and flourish, they turn to outside 
financing.23  To gain access to outside finance, innovators need to convince 
 
Venture Capital, and Software Startups, Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager compare the 
biotech industry to the software industry.  Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture 
Capital, and Software Startups, 36 RESEARCH POL’Y 193 (2007).  In High Technology 
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, Stuart J.H. 
Graham, et al., compared the biotechnology, medical device, software/internet, and IT hardware 
industries.  While Graham et al., also find that VC backing correlated with patenting and that the 
software industry behave differently than the biotech industry, they report higher patent numbers 
than Mann et al. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009). 
 21.  Mann, supra note 14, at 985–96. 
 22.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-465, ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 14 (2013). 
 23.  See e.g. Metrick, supra note 5, at 17, exhibit 1-6; Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, 
Financing Technology-Based Small Firms in Europe: What Do We Know?, 39 SMALL BUS. 
ECON. 179 (2012) (showing that high-tech European companies rely on internal funds at the early 
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outsiders to invest.  To convince outsiders, innovators can resort to sending 
the “correct” signals. 
On the supply side, VC funds provide finances to startups.  Since most 
VC funds have a short lifespan,24 they rely on selling their stakes to profit 
(instead of collecting dividends).25  A successful sale involves an initial 
public offering (IPO) where the VCs’ stakes are sold to a public or to 
another company in case of an acquisition.26  To profit, a VC needs to 
successfully convince a public or another company about the investment’s 
soundness.  As a result, sending signals can help convince outsiders. 
Over its lifetime, a company might send signals to VCs to get initial 
financing and to the public to get further financing.  Patents can serve as a 
signal on both occasions.  This section investigates how startups use 
patents as signals.  The section concludes by discussing whether these 
signals work in the software industry. 
A. From Patenting to Investments 
Investors are less interested in defining and measuring innovation and 
more interested in profiting from innovation.27  VCs want the companies 
they fund to innovate because innovation lead to higher profits according to 
Schumpeterian principles.  Scholars have debated over the role of VC 
funds in the innovation process: Do VC funds encourage innovation?28 Or 
 
stage and outside financing at a later stage); William B. Gartner, Casey J. Frid, & John C. 
Alexander, Financing the Emerging Firm, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 745 (2012) (estimating the 
most common source of financing for young firms). 
 24.  VC funds are a limited partnership built to usually last ten years.  They are extendable 
under certain circumstances.  See e.g., William A. Sahlman, The structure and governance of 
venture-capital organizations, J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The 
Venture Capital Revolution. 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 145 (2001). 
 25.  Metrick, et al., supra note 5, at 178–80.  Profiting upon exit contrasts with other 
investors who profit from collecting interest on loan repayments like banks or dividends like 
long-term entrepreneur-investors. 
 26.  Id. at 179. 
 27.  See e.g., Zvi Griliches, R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 315–19 (1998) (discussing how stock market prices respond to 
changes in patent filings and reporting mixed evidence about this impact); James Bessen, Jennifer 
Ford, and Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patents Trolls, 34 REGULATION 26 
(2011-2012) (discussing the reaction of investors and the stock market to filing patent suits and 
showing that investors may overreact). 
 28.  What constitutes an innovation is beyond the scope of this paper.  For simplicity, a 
“product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly improved 
with respect to its characteristics or intended uses.”  OECD & EUROSTAT, OSLO MANUAL 48 
OECD PUBLISHING (3d ed. 2005).  “This includes significant improvements in technical 
specifications, components and materials, incorporated software, user friendliness or other 
functional characteristics.”  Id.  Beside product innovation, the OECD and Eurostat identify three 
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do they accurately spot innovative companies?29  The truth is probably 
somewhere in between these two views.30 
This section analyzes these innovation selecting and the innovation 
inducing hypotheses.  Because innovation is difficult to measure, scholars 
have used patents as a proxy for innovation.31  This section argues that 
patents seemingly play such a proxy role for investors as well. 
On the one hand, if investors can only spot but cannot encourage 
innovation, investors must carefully select the companies.  They must find 
ways to separate companies with high innovative potential from companies 
with low innovative potential, and to invest in the former.32  This task can, 
however, prove difficult. 
First, entrepreneurs cannot directly exhibit their innovativeness 
because disclosing their content can destroy its potential value.33  Second, 
innovative potential can be faked: if a fund-seeking entrepreneur knows 
how investors select companies, he or she will try to exhibit the sought-out 
characteristics, which includes innovativeness.34  These two problems force 
inventors to indirectly signal their innovativeness.  A good signal is costly 
enough to separate individuals with low and high potential,35 and cheap 
enough to allow recipients to access it.36 
 
types of innovation: process innovations, marketing innovations, and organizational innovations.  
Id. at 47.  These last three types of innovation are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 29.  See Masayuki Hirukawa & Masako Ueda, Venture Capital and Innovation: Which is 
First?, 16 PAC. ECON. REV. 421 (2011). 
 30.  “Firms that seek venture-funding appear to be patenting more actively prior to the 
funding event (and for the purpose of securing funding), and venture-capital investors appear 
much less willing to fund companies that hold no patents.”  Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1280. 
 31.  Patents are legal title to a monopoly over the innovation.  Griliches, supra note 27, at 
289. Companies may decide to not protect their innovation or use another form of protection 
(e.g., trade secret) or the innovation may simply not be patentable.  Id. at 296.  Thus, patents may 
constitute an imperfect proxy.  Id. at 301 (discussing the validity of using patent as a measure of 
inventive output).  Griliches argues that patents may provide a good indicator when comparing 
behavior across firms and across industry but is a less accurate indicator within firms.  Id.  The 
size of the company (as measured by R&D expenditure) impacts the relationship between R&D 
and patent filings.  Id. at 303.  The propensity to file a patent for invention differs according to 
industries as well.  Id. at 308. 
 32.  See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 5, at 123–35 (highlighting the different failure rates 
VC funds experience depending on the stage of financing involvement).  VC funds that invest at 
earlier stages often face higher failure rate.  Id. 
 33.  See Arrow, supra note 12, at 615 (discussing the information value paradox). 
 34.  See Matthew Beacham & Bipasa Datta, Who Becomes the Winner?  Effects of Venture 
Capital on Firms’ Innovative Incentives – A Theoretical Investigation, 7–10 (Univ. of York, 
Working Paper No. 13/33, 2013) (building a theoretical model to show the different incentives of 
companies with high or low skillsets). 
 35.  Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355, 358 (1973) (discussing the 
role that signal costs play in effectively defeating information asymmetries and using the example 
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Patents have served as an efficient signal because they are costly to 
produce, verifiable, and costless to access.37  First, patents are often quite 
costly to obtain,38 and they generally are costly to retain.39  If an innovator 
is rational, she will only file a patent if she expects the benefits to outweigh 
the costs.  Signaling the innovative potential to outsiders constitutes such a 
benefit.  A patent that signals her innovative potential may even justify the 
patenting cost40 when she may have otherwise used other means to protect 
her innovation –– such as trade secrets. 
Second, patents are verifiable and verified.  The government verifies 
patents in two principal ways.  A patent office must first verify and approve 
that the patent fulfills certain criteria before a patent becomes valid.41  The 
 
of education as a costly and time consuming signal that job seekers may elect to signal to 
employers their worth); Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 655–660 (2002) 
(discussing the importance of making the signal costly enough to avoid multiple equilibria).  A 
good signal should also reflect the underlying quality being signaled.  See id. at 671. 
 36.  Long, supra note 35, at 644 (“The strategy of firms will thus be to convey in-formation 
about their positive attributes in a way that presents low acquisition and verification costs to the 
intended recipients.”).  The issue is twofold: Outsiders cannot directly observe innovation 
potential and they cannot trust what they are told.  An outsider may not be able to directly 
observe the innovative potential because innovators wish to keep it secret and young companies 
may not have yet realized this potential.  An outsider may not trust an entrepreneur to directly 
express the truth about the company’s innovative potential because of the distorted incentive to 
exhibit the sought-out characteristics.  Of course, an entrepreneur knows more about her company 
than outsiders and this unequal knowledge creates information asymmetries that have been 
usually resolved through signaling. IPO and investment literature focused on the signal theory.  
See, e.g,. James C. Brau, & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory 
and Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399 (2006) (performing a survey of company officers to determine what 
signals are important for a successful IPO). 
 37.  Carolin Haeussler, Dietmar Harhoff & Elisabeth Müller, To Be Financed or Not: The 
Role of Patents for Venture Capital Financing (Munich Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2009-
02, 2009) (investigating, empirically, whether patent filing and patent quality impact the 
likelihood of receiving financing in the German and British biotechnology industry).  Haessler et 
al., found that having patent applications increased the likelihood of receiving funding, and that 
the changes in the patent application stock provided results that were more statistically 
significant.  Id. at 22.  Patent quality also increased the likelihood of receiving funding in a 
statistically significant way.  Id. 
 38.  For instance, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2013 27 (2013) cites $10,000 patent fees for electronic/computer in 2012. 
 39.  For more information on the fee schedules, see USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2014). 
 40.  Long, supra note 35, at 627, argues that, “[P]atents can serve as a means of reducing 
informational asymmetries between patentees and observers. The ability to convey information 
credibly to observers at low cost is a highly valuable function of patents. . . .”  Using a model, she 
later argues the information cost reducing role of patents can explain why patents may be worth 
the cost, aside from the rent they produce.  Id. at 644. 
 41.  The criteria are different in most jurisdictions.  For instance, the USPTO verifies that 
the invention is: (1) useful, 35 U.S.C § 101 (2015); (2) novel, 35 U.S.C § 102 (2015); and (3) 
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courts also legitimize any patents that have successfully been litigated and 
upheld.42  Similarly, industry participants can signal the value of a patent 
through citations43 because subsequent patents must cite patents which they 
rely on.44  In conclusion, even if an investor does not have the required 
expertise, she can still easily access this signal and its value because other 
entities (whether governmental or other industry participants) vouch for the 
patent’s quality. 
However, an investor does not have to rely solely on these entities to 
assess the signal’s value because she can research the patent’s content.  To 
obtain a patent, innovators must disclose the contents of their invention.45  
An investor can access the patent office’s records and read the documents 
relating to the patent.  Because VC fund managers specialize in an 
economic sector, they often possess the expertise required to evaluate 
patents.46  Patent disclosure helps dispel some information asymmetries 
without destroying the information’s (and innovation’s) value.47  Empirical 
evidences support that VCs use company portfolio when deciding whether 
 
non-obvious, 35 U.S.C § 103 (2015).  Long, supra note 35, at 667-68, argues at that “[t]he PTO is 
an imperfect mechanism . . . for assuring that information contained in a patent is credible” 
because the evaluation can be rushed and incomplete. 
 42.  During a patent litigation, a court can decide on the validity of the patent along the same 
criteria used by the patent office to grant a patent.  Furthermore, the court must decide whether 
infringement occurred; hence, the court decides upon the boundaries of the patent.  Patent 
enforcement is an even more costly signal because it involves more actions: monitoring 
infringements and costly litigating court.  GAO Study, supra note 22, at 9–11 (discussing the 
enforcement of patents). 
 43.  Haeussler et al., supra note 37, at 16 (discussing the value of patents as signal to obtain 
financing.  They investigate as well the quality of the signal sent by patents: they estimate patent 
quality using patent citations because patents that receive citation are considered prior art.  They 
find that “companies with highly cited patents receive VCs financing faster than firms with 
infrequently cited patent applications.”). 
 44.  Long, supra note 35, at 652.  Investors can also look at the original patent to look at 
what patents it cites and benchmark this patent with respect to previous patents; Samuel Kortum 
& Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 
674, 689–90 (2000) (arguing that citations and litigations are two indicators of a patent’s value). 
 45.  This disclosure is the quid pro quo for gaining an enforceable legal monopoly.  The 
patent holder can exploit this monopoly power or outsource the exploitation through licensing or 
selling agreements or refuse to exploit it as well. 
 46.  Long, supra note 35, at 666 (discussing the cost of evaluating signals like patent and 
requiring the intervention of experts); George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the 
World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, (2001) (discussing the importance of 
intermediaries like venture capital funds and banks because they provide specialized knowledge 
and can evaluate projects); Olav Sorenson & Toby E. Stuart, Syndication Networks and the 
Spatial Distribution of Venture Capital Investments, 106 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1546, 1577 (2001) 
(empirically testing the impact of industry experience and finding that industry experience have a 
statistically significant on the likelihood of financing a company). 
 47.  Haeussler et al., supra note 37. 
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to invest,48 even if patents constitute a problematic proxy for innovative 
potential.49 
On the other hand, if VCs can encourage companies to innovate,50 
they will encourage innovation only if they can profit from it.  To 
encourage profitable innovation, investors must align their incentives with 
the company managers or inventor’s incentive.  Realigning incentives can, 
however, prove to be difficult because, by investing, VCs separate control 
from capital and dis-align these incentives; hence, VCs inadvertently create 
an agency problem.51 
To overcome this agency problem, VCs have mostly relied on two 
solutions.52  First, investors can realign their incentives with the innovator’s 
through financial inducements.53  For instance, investors can request a stage 
financing clause, which specifies that an entrepreneur and its VC agree on 
installment investments that are disbursed only if the entrepreneur reaches 
certain milestones (e.g., prototype, mass production, etc.).54  This method 
assures that an innovator-entrepreneur remains motivated to develop an 
innovation along a VC-selected timeline. 
Second, investors can realign incentives through direct intervention.  
By this way, VCs can monitor and control some activities.  For instance, 
investors can demand that the innovator-entrepreneur yields some positions 
 
 48.  See e.g. Dirk Engel and Max Keilbach, Firm-level Implications of Early Stage Venture 
Capital Investment – An Empirical Investigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 150 (2007) (empirically 
testing and finding that German venture-capital-backed startups have more patent filing than 
comparable non-venture-capital-backed startups but they are already filing more application 
before the engagement of venture capital funds, which means that funds invest in companies that 
patents instead of encouraging patenting). 
 49.  See supra note 31. 
 50.  Kortum & Lerner, supra note 44 (attempting to estimate the impact of venture capital 
activity on patent filing controlling for R&D investment).  They find a positive relationship 
between venture capital investment and patenting.  They further test the casual direction of the 
relationship.  They use the liberalization of investment rules, which only impact venture capital 
funding, to control for the causality of the effects.  They find that increasing venture financing 
increases patenting. 
 51.  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. OF 
L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the issues associated with control, which makes the decision, 
from separating ownership, which bears the consequences of decisions because transaction costs 
lead incomplete contracts). 
 52.  Gilson, supra note 7, also discusses the use of compensation schemes involving 
performance incentives and exit call option at 1083–85. 
 53.  Id. at 1079 (“Staged financing aligns the interests of the venture capital fund and the 
entrepreneur by creating a substantial performance incentive. If the portfolio company does not 
meet the milestone whose completion was funded in the initial round of financing, the venture 
capital fund has the power to shut the project down by declining to fund the project’s next 
round.”). 
 54.  Id. 
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of control in the company.  VCs often request seats on the company’s 
board of directors55 to remain involved and monitor the company’s 
activities.  Relinquishing too many seats (and control) may, however, 
signal a poor investment because it can indicate that an entrepreneur has 
little leverage through outside opportunities.56  Investors would then need 
to screen companies for the appropriate level of malleability.57 
Even under this VC-inducing innovation hypothesis, patents can be 
used as signal.  Since VCs profit from exiting companies, they must send 
the proper signal to attract outside investors.58  VCs can signal before 
exiting through patenting the company’s innovative and profit potential.  
This hypothesis has been verified empirically.59 
Under both the selecting and inducing hypothesis, patenting plays a 
role as signal.  While this section examined the general signaling value of 
patents, their value varies from industry to industry.  The following section 
discusses the role of patents in the software industry. 
B. The Software Industry 
Software patents continue to create a debate.  In the United States, 
software innovators can patent and/or copyright their software 
innovations.60  Patenting software protects processes and against reverse 
 
 55.  Id. at 1082-83. 
 56.  In Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance, 21 REV. FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1947 
(2008), Douglas Cumming estimates that venture capital fund managers who exercise more 
control are more likely to exit via an acquisition than IPO or a write-off using a sample of 
European venture capital backed companies.  He argues that more VCs’ control rights are usually 
associated with less promising companies.  Id. at 1950. 
 57.  VCs need to balance the need to exercise control to encourage innovation without 
stifling or wrongly steering innovation.  The VC’s expertise becomes important in this context 
because she may be able to understand the industry specific difficulties. 
 58.  “Because entry and exit is more difficult for investors in a privately held firm, such 
investors can be expected to place a higher marginal value on gaining information about each 
firm’s attributes than would investors in publicly held firms.”  Long, supra note 36, at 673. 
 59.  “This finding suggests that patents cast an important signal not only to VC audiences 
but also to investors in public equity markets.”  David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patents 
as Quality Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures, Academy of Management Proceedings 25 
(2008) (estimating the impact of patent as signal at different stages of a startup financing cycle 
and finding that patent application stock is strongly correlated with the likelihood of a venture’s 
final funding was through an IPO). 
 60.  See e.g. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 539 (2003) (stating that “computer programs are eligible for protection 
under both copyright – as creative works of authorship — and patent — as items of functional 
utility”). 
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engineering.61  Patenting grants an innovator protection over the software’s 
innovative sections.62  Copyrighting software grants longer protection63 at a 
lower cost.64  Copyright protects against literal copying.65  This option 
between patenting and copyrighting makes software unique.  Software 
patent and copyright have their upsides and downsides, which are beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Patents can serve to incentivize innovators by granting them a right to 
exclude others to use their innovation.  However, in the software industry, 
patents have arguably been used to signal potential.  First, the software 
patent granting process and lifecycle support that patents are more of a 
signal than an asset: a software patent takes on average almost three years 
to be granted whereas users update or change software on average once in 
that period.66  Hence, by the time a software innovator can take advantage 
of her monopoly, users have moved on. 
Second, VCs backing is correlated with higher patenting levels.  A 
2008 study reports that software startups backed by VCs applied or hold 
5.9 patents on average as compared to 1.7 for the software startup general 
population; and that 67 percent of VCs backed software startups held at 
least one patent while only 24 percent of the software startup general 
population.67  While VCs backed companies may be more innovative 
(selection hypothesis), non-VCs backed companies may simply not wish to 
patent because they do not have a need for it. 
More particularly, software companies generally delay patenting68 and 
this delay supports the signaling argument.  While budget constraints may 
 
 61.  Julie E. Cohen and Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2001) arguing that patenting should not protect reverse 
engineering efforts. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Patents are valid for up to 20 years from the date of filing (35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)) while 
copyright protection are valid for up to “the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s 
death” (17 U.S. Code § 302). 
 64.  American Intellectual Property Law Association, Report of the Economic Survey 2013, 
(2013) cites $350 copyright fees and $10,000 patent fees for electrical/computer in 2012.  For 
more information on the fee schedules, see U.S. Copyright Office http://copyright.gov/docs/ 
fees.html; United State Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2014). 
 65.  “In the language often used by courts interpreting the Copyright Act, this issue boils 
down to the protectibility of literal copying of ‘non-literal’ elements of a software program.”  
Weiser, supra note 60, n. 13. 
 66.  See footnote supra note 17 & 18. 
 67.  Graham et al., supra note 20, Table 1. 
 68.  See e.g., the discussion in Mann and Sager, supra note 20 (estimating the differences 
between the biotechnology industry and the software industry and finding lower patenting rates 
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dictate this delay,69 VC funds invest millions into software companies70 and 
can afford to file a patent.  If software patents are mainly viewed as a 
valuable asset, a rational VC should not delay patenting (to protect their 
investments) because of value discounting71 and knowing the speed of the 
industry.72  VCs must delay because software patent value is affected 
overtime.73  If software patents are mainly viewed as a valuable signal, 
patents only become valuable when VCs prepare to exit.74 
Finally, as one study reports, software patents have traditionally not 
generated revenue streams or been heavily enforced prior to 2005 as 
reported by one study.75  This trend has changed and a GAO study reveals 
 
and a large gap between both industry before the first investment rounds) and Mann, supra note 
21 (arguing on the differences of patenting in the software industry). 
 69.  GAO Study, supra note 22, reports that “a few representatives of venture capital and 
software startup firms told [GAO] that they do not always apply for patents until their companies 
are well established because patent attorneys are expensive, and the process is time consuming.”  
Id. at 34–35.  Graham et al., supra note 20, find that software startups patent less often and with 
lesser intensity than biotechnology, medical device, and IT hardware startups.  Id. at Table 1.  
And Table 2 shows that the most cited reason for not seeking patent protection is the cost of 
patenting in the software industry. 
 70.  See infra Section IV. A. (explaining that between 2005 and 2012, VCs invested on 
average $5.6 million into each software company according to a dataset from Dow Jones). 
 71.  See generally, What is the Formula for Calculating Net Present Value?, 
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/021115/whatformulacalculating 
netpresentvaluenpvexcel.asp.  The present value of a patent is the sum of the marginal profits 
received from filing a patent over the life of a patent as compared to not filing a patent.  This 
value is higher today than it is tomorrow based on the future value discount/present value 
calculation of economics since people discount the future because of its uncertainties, inflation, 
and other factors such as preferences.  However, because a competitor may be able to file a 
similar patent, filing a patent tomorrow may be worthless if someone else filed it.  In other words, 
rational individuals value the present more than the future. 
 72.  See generally What is the Formula for Calculating Net Present Value?, 
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/021115/whatformulacalculating 
netpresentvaluenpvexcel.asp.  The implicit assumption is that the value of a patent diminishes 
because of present value discounting of future value, inflation, and because of competing 
researcher willing to patent the same idea.  In other words, assets are more valuable today than in 
the future. 
 73.  See generally Inefficient Market, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
articles/05/032905.asp?rp=i.  The discussion assumes that VCs can sell patents.  If the market for 
patent is efficient, then patenting an exploiting the innovation itself or patenting and selling the 
patent should be worth the same.  While markets for patent are likely inefficient because 
information asymmetries and search cost to find a buyer, a VC should likely be able to recoup the 
cost of patent filing. 
 74.  Delaying patenting –– instead of patenting or not patenting –– does not seem rational, 
unless the value of patent as a signal changes over time because its value as an asset should not.  
A priori, startups may be as innovative as incumbent companies; a nonestablished company 
seeking a path may not need to signal its potential while an established one seeking further fund 
may need to signal its potential. 
 75.  See discussion supra note 19. 
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that software patent litigation has increased more rapidly than non-software 
litigation not involving software between 2007 and 2011.76  The next 
section discusses software patent litigation and particularly PAEs, which 
have been playing a central role in this change in philosophy.  Seemingly, 
to gain access to funds, VCs have incentivized software entrepreneurs to 
seek funding through patents.  Accordingly, VCs have indirectly fed into 
the litigious changes. 
III. Patent Assertion Entities Impacting the Software Industry 
The previous section has showed that software patents play a role as a 
signal; yet, they remain a potential asset.  Still, VCs may prefer companies 
with large patent portfolios because these portfolios may guarantee larger 
profits through patent-granted monopolies.  These portfolios can also be 
sold in case of failure.77 
Moreover, patents can be strategically used to increase the 
competitor’s costs.  For instance, through a patent, its holder gains an 
associated right to exclude others from using her patented innovation.78  
Patents can be strategically used to defend against competitors’ claims.  For 
instance, a company can use its patents as defense during an infringement 
lawsuit or leverage their patents to instigate counter-claims.79 
Recently, some entities have disrupted the software patent ecosystem.  
These entities enforce but do not utilize patents.  Their activities have 
changed how market participants value patents as assets.  This section 
discusses non-practicing entities.  It argues that these entities help as well 
 
 76.  See GAO Study, supra note 22, at Figure 5. 
 77.  See, e.g., John E. Dubiansky, An Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded 
Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 170 (2006) (discussing the issues venture 
capitalists face valuing patent before their sell and give the example of VC firms who specialized 
in reselling intellectual property of failed startups). 
 78.  Holders enforce this right of exclusion through litigation: litigating may conclude in an 
injunction ordering the infringer to not use the patented innovation or in royalty damages 
transferring funds from the infringer to the patent holder; however, the court may also hold that 
the alleged infringer did not infringe or that the patent is invalid.  Injunctions are more difficult to 
obtain: “In the 2006 eBay decision, the Supreme Court ruled that district courts should not 
assume an injunction was automatically needed in patent infringement cases and instead should 
use the same test used in other cases to determine whether to award the plaintiff an injunction. 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  According to several legal 
commentators we spoke with, this decision has generally made it more difficult for NPEs to 
obtain injunctions in the courts and has led them to pursue exclusion orders at ITC –– although 
there may have been other reasons for the increase in filings, including the relative speed of 
proceedings at ITC.”  GAO Study, supra note 22, at 11 n.26. 
 79.  Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1300–02. 
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as hinder innovation and concludes by looking at the software industry and 
the impacts of these entities have on the financing of innovation. 
A. Patent Assertion Entities Impacting the Innovation Ecosystem 
Non-practicing entities encompass a multitude of entities.  These 
entities live along a spectrum.  At one end of the spectrum are inventors 
who do not exploit their patents.  Universities and research centers often 
perform research and file a patent based on their research, but do not 
develop products or services that utilize these patents (but may license 
them).80 
At the other end of the spectrum are entities that exploit patents but do 
not invest in R&D or invent.  For instance, some organizations have 
developed a business model that relies on purchasing patents and licensing 
them or enforcing them for revenues.81  These organizations have been 
credited with driving the increase in patent litigation at a large cost to 
society.82 
In other words, these entities monetize patents but do not utilize 
patents: they profit either by acquiring and licensing patents83 or by 
litigating infringers.84  The companies, “whose business model primarily 
focuses on purchasing and asserting patents,”85 are often referred to as 
patent monetization entities or patent assertion entities (PAE),86 to 
 
 80.  GAO Study, supra note 22, at 2. 
 81.  Id. at 19. 
 82.  James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 387, 389 (2014) (estimating that non-practicing entities cost accrued $29 billion of direct 
costs in 2011.)  This figure however, has been criticized for being overinflated, David L. 
Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the role of non-practicing entities in the patent system, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 425, 433, 440 (2014) (arguing that this figure is biased upward because it 
includes litigation that may have been brought regardless and because monetary transfers between 
entities differ from costs to economists.) 
 83.  Thought, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. 12-cv-05601-WHO (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 84.  Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995 (E.D. Va. 2011) 
(stating that the plaintiff is a “‘non-practicing entity,’ meaning that it does not research and 
develop new technology but rather acquires patents, licenses the technology, and sues alleged 
infringers. [Plaintiff]’s main line of business is enforcing its intellectual property rights, and a 
large part of that task involves threatening to file lawsuits.”). 
 85.  FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition, at 94–103 (Mar. 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/11 
0307patentreport.pdf. 
 86.  “Some NPEs simply buy patents from others for the purpose of asserting them for 
profit; these NPEs are known as patent monetization entities (PME).”  The GAO study, supra 
note 22, at 2.  But “[t]he Federal Trade Commission uses the related term ‘patent assertion 
entities’ to focus on entities whose business model solely focuses on asserting typically purchased 
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distinguish them from other nonpracticing entities (NPEs) like university 
and research institutions, which develop technologies.87  PAEs are 
sometimes also referred as patent trolls.88 
PAEs have developed three different types of business models:89 They 
sue and hope for a big jury award; they sue and negotiate quickly for a low-
value settlement (leveraging high litigation costs); or they accumulate large 
quantities of patents and license this portfolio (under the threat of suing 
nonlicensed alleged infringers).90  Regardless of their business model, these 
entities present major upsides and downsides. 
On the one hand, PAEs provide inventors with the opportunity to raise 
more funds from their patented innovation.  PAEs transfer funds through 
licensing or sales from technology users to patent holders.91 
Since innovators receive more funds, PAEs should incentivize 
inventors to innovate more.92  Assuming that an innovator is rational and 
 
patents. As such, the PME term also encompasses entities that might use third-party NPEs to 
assert patents for them.”  The GAO study, supra note 23, at n. 6. 
 87.  For an in-depth definition of nonpracticing entities and patent trolls, see for example 
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUMB. L. 
REV. 2117 (2013); Schwartz et al., supra note 22. 
 88.  See, e.g., In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 174 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (“‘non-
practicing entity’ or ‘NPE’ (sometimes disparagingly referred to as a ‘patent troll’).”). “Not all 
NPEs are referred to as ‘patent trolls.’ For example, research universities may develop patented 
technology but not practice the patents.”  Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 
12-CV-01143 YGR, 2013 WL 316023, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013). 
 89.  Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 
2015).  The Executive Office of the President has identified seven characteristics for these kinds 
of patent assertion entities: “1. They do not “practice” their patents; that is, they do not do 
research or develop any technology or products related to their patents; 2. They do not help with 
“technology transfer” (the process of translating the patent language into a usable product or 
process); 3. They often wait until after industry participants have made irreversible investments 
before asserting their claims; 4. They acquire patents solely for the purpose of extracting 
payments from alleged infringers; 5. Their strategies for litigation take advantage of their non-
practicing status, which makes them invulnerable to counter-claims of patent infringement; 6. 
They acquire patents whose claim boundaries are unclear, and then (with little specific evidence 
of infringement) ask many companies at once for moderate license fees, assuming that some will 
settle instead of risking a costly and uncertain trial; 7. They may hide their identity by creating 
numerous shell companies and requiring those who settle to sign non-disclosure agreements, 
making it difficult for defendants to form common defensive strategies (for example, by sharing 
legal fees rather than settling individually).” 
 90.  Lemley et al., supra note 87, at 2126; The GAO study, supra note 22, at 14 (“some 
stakeholders . . . said that they experienced a substantial amount of patent assertion without firms 
ever filing lawsuits against them.”).  These licenses have been referred as stick licenses, where 
the potential infringer takes a license under threat of litigation. 
 91.  Lemley et al., supra note 87, at 2124–25. 
 92.  See Cottle et al., supra note 15, at 215 (discussing how “NPEs also introduce liquidity 
into technology markets” because “when acquiring rights to an individual’s or a company’s patent 
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risk neutral, she invests in innovating only if her expected benefits from 
innovating outweigh her expected costs.  This innovator forms expectations 
about the value of her innovation.  This valuation is based upon either 
exploiting the innovation or licensing or selling it. 
An innovator may opt to license her patent because she cannot exploit 
it or simply because she prefers to let others exploit it.  First, an innovator 
may struggle to exploit her innovation because of budget constraints (e.g., 
costly product development or manufacturing), or because she lacks 
necessary supporting patents, or because she lacks the clout to maximize 
profits.93  Second, an innovator may simply specialize in R&D and prefer 
to license instead of exploiting her innovation. 
Regardless of her reasons, an innovator may struggle to license her 
patent due to the licensing-related transaction costs.  One study found94 that 
a minority of companies licenses out their patents,95 but companies often 
wish to license more.96  Companies mostly cite identifying licensing 
partners as the most important problem –– above issues surrounding 
licensing fees, negotiation costs, and technology advances.97 
Innovators can benefit from an intermediary.  Such an intermediary 
has proven useful for small and medium enterprises in Korea.98  These 
enterprises have used the services of the Korean Integrated Contract 
Manufacturing Service to enhance their collaborative efforts and help them 
“diffuse their innovative technologies.”99 
 
or portfolio, the NPE acts as a technology broker and facilitates a robust technology 
marketplace.”). 
 93.   For instance, even if an innovator could exploit her patent, she may not profit because 
she might not even have the resources to enforce her patent and exploit her monopoly.  “[P]atent 
enforcement has become financially undoable for small startup companies.  NPEs provide an 
avenue to protect assets that would otherwise be lost due to financial constraints.”  Colleen V. 
Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AM. FOUND., OPEN TECHN. INST. WHITE 
PAPER 18 (2013). 
 94.  Maria Pluvia Zuniga & Dominique Guellec, Who Licenses Out Patents and Why? 
Lessons from a Business Survey (OECD Sci., Tech. and Indus. Working Papers, Working Paper 
No. 2009/05, 2009), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/224447241101. 
 95.  Twenty-seven percent of Japanese companies declared to license patents to 
nonaffiliated partners while the corresponding figure for European companies is twenty percent. 
Zuniga & Guellec, supra note 94, at 12. 
 96.  Forty-five percent of European companies and eighty percent of Japanese companies 
that already license want to license more.  Zuniga & Guellec, supra note 95, at 20. 
 97.  Zuniga & Guellec, supra note 94, at 21. 
 98.  Sungjoo Lee, Gwangman Park, Byungun Yoon & Jinwoo Park, Open Innovation in 
SMEs—An Intermediated Network Model, 39 RESEARCH POL’Y 290, 296–99 (2010). 
 99.  Lee et al., supra note 98, at 296–99. 
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PAEs can play this intermediary role and provide middlemen 
services.100  PAEs, by definition, must repeatedly and profitably purchase 
patents; therefore, they have the required skillset to price the patents 
correctly.  PAEs can use these interactions to build a network to identify 
viable partners, to help innovators sell101 and price their innovation.102  As 
such, they can serve as a hub for patents or market places. 
By creating opportunities for licensing and sale revenues, PAEs 
incentivize patenting innovation.103  Basic economics dictate that if the 
innovation market functions efficiently, the presence of PAEs shifts the 
patent demand curve.  In the long term, the equilibrium supplied quantity 
of patents should increase whereas the impact on the equilibrium price of 
patent is ambiguous. 
PAEs may encourage innovators to patent innovations that would not 
have otherwise been patented; or they may also encourage innovators to 
innovate more than they would otherwise have.  Assuming that PAEs 
encourage innovation, it is also ambiguous whether the incentivized 
innovations are socially efficient innovations.104  On the one hand, the 
PAEs that use the first business model105 rely on acquiring valuable patents 
and enforcing them; these PAEs should encourage patenting valuable 
innovations.  On the other hand, second and third business-model PAEs do 
not necessarily encourage socially efficient innovations and their patenting 
 
 100.  See generally Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 315–17 (2010) 
(discussing the role of intermediaries in the patent system, including the PAEs). 
 101.  See generally Linus Dahlander & David M. Gann, How Open Is Innovation?, 39 
RESEARCH POL’Y 699 (2010). Linus Dahlander & David M. Gann perform a review of the 
literature on Open Innovation, a business model which relies on bringing inside a company 
outside innovation and sending outside a company innovation.  They highlight the literature that 
discusses the issues with selling (or licensing) innovation.  Id at 704.  They highlight the issues 
with disclosure, valuation, and technology transfer costs. 
 102.  See generally James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View 
of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006) (NPEs 
can then license or collect fees for these patents: they act as intermediaries and decrease 
transaction costs for innovators who do not have the expertise to license their patent, to negotiate 
fees, or enforce their patent.  “These trolls act as a market intermediary in the patent market.  
Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets –– 
the same benefits securities dealers supply capital markets.”). 
 103.  See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 82, at 434 (“By creating options to generate 
rewards for innovators otherwise shutout of the marketplace . . . [t]ogether with contingency fee 
lawyers whose business models depend on choosing the right patents and the right patentees, 
NPEs can create important avenues for appropriating rewards for valuable patent rights that are 
owned by non-market players.”). 
 104.  A socially efficient innovation is an innovation whose social benefit from innovating 
outweighs the social cost of innovating. 
 105.  Executive Office of the Present, supra note 89. 
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because they rent-seek based on nuisance demands/suits and scale 
leveraging for revenues.106 
Finally, first business model PAEs also provides a public good 
because, through litigation, they challenge patents and establish their 
boundaries.107  If an innovation is cumulative,108 then knowing the patent 
boundaries helps subsequent innovators assess the innovation added value.  
If a court validates a patent and sets its boundaries, a follow-on innovator 
also knows whether to negotiate a license from the original patent holder.109  
When second and third business model PAEs intervene, courts never have 
a chance to assess a patent’s validity or boundaries. 
On the other hand, PAEs disrupt innovation systems because they 
impose additional costs upon innovators.  First, they enforce patents that 
may not have been enforced otherwise.  For instance, the original patents 
may not have been enforced because the original holder could not afford to 
enforce.  Some industries also have a culture of cross-licensing;110 hence, 
putting patents in the hand of PAEs disrupts such culture. 
Second, these entities have been heavily criticized in recent times as a 
tax on innovation111 because they use their superior bargaining position to 
 
 106.  Since the PAEs that deploy the third business model rely on acquiring a large portfolio 
and leveraging them, they encourage patenting any innovation regardless of their added value. 
 107.  See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 
5 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1715 (2008) (“When a firm gets a patent, it encloses the commons, making 
private what would otherwise be public . . .  But when a firm challenges a patent, it creates a 
public good, because if it successfully challenges a patent, that piece of knowledge enters the 
public domain, where anybody can use it.  Thus, challenging a patent is a public good. The result, 
of course, is that there will be an underinvestment in fighting bad patents, and an overinvestment 
in trying to get bad patents.”). 
 108.  For a broad discussion of cumulative innovation and the associated issues, see for 
example Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).  In general, more frequently cited patents are more 
valuable because their innovator-declared and implied value (using patent renewal as proxy) is 
positively correlated to the number of citations.  Dietmar Harhoff, Francis Narin, Frederic M. 
Scherer & Katrin Vopel, Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 511 (1999). 
 109.  This has lead different countries to approach this issue differently.  “For example, in the 
United States, patent holders do not have a duty to license and their licensing actions are limited 
only by antitrust law, but in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, compulsory license 
statutes require patent holders to license their products.” T. R. Beard, George S. Ford, Thomas M. 
Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Quantifying the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary 
Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH 240, 249 (2010). 
 110.  Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 341 (2012) 
(discussing the culture of cross-licensing among patent holders, which can become difficult with 
the presence of PAEs). 
 111.  Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Does Patent Licensing Mean Innovation? (Stan. L. 
& Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 473, 2015). 
GABISON_PAE_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2015  3:41 PM 
118 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:1 
impose costs on innovators without providing added value.  Their superior 
bargaining position rests on their nonparticipation in the industry: 
Innovators/alleged infringers have a product at stakes; they can be locked 
into a technology with high switching cost; and they may have invested in 
second-generation innovation, whereas PAEs are immune to cross-claims 
because they have no products at stake.112  PAEs can leverage this position 
and extract more rent from alleged infringers who fear large damages or an 
injunction, which would prevent innovators from producing their 
products.113 
PAEs also burden the judicial system.114  Second business model 
includes PAEs filing suits and negotiating low-value settlement; hence, 
they require court intervention and clog dockets.  Even though third-
business-model PAEs rely on threats, they may need, from time to time, to 
carry out their threats and file out a suit in order to substantiate these 
threats.115  Under both business models, PAEs leverage litigation costs to 
gain more profits.116 
PAEs likely discourage socially efficient cumulative innovations 
because they create uncertainties.  They encourage innovators to patent 
their inventions through financial incentives, some of which might not have 
been patented otherwise.  Therefore, PAEs feed into the system and make it 
more difficult to see patent boundaries.  This behavior of patenting more 
innovations leads to patent thicket, “a term used to describe ‘a dense web 
 
 112.  Only a small number of companies opt to switch products.  Colleen Chien, Startups and 
Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461 (2014) (explaining that faced with NPEs litigation 9% 
of respondents decided to change their product).  NPEs can exploit the switching cost from the 
adopted technology to any alternative technology. 
 113.  “The Federal Circuit focused on the high costs for defendants to defend, the burden of 
complying with discovery, and the minimal risk to non-practicing entities because they have no 
actual products at stake.”  Summit Data Sys., LLC v EMC Corp., No. 10-749-GMS, 2014 WL 
4955689, at *4 (D. Del. Sept. 25, 2014). 
 114.  These entities have been associated with large social welfare impact.  Bessen & Meurer, 
supra note 82 (estimating that NPEs accrued $29 billion of direct costs in 2011). 
 115.  “The typical scenario begins with an NPE contacting a targeted company through a 
cease and desist letter accusing the company of infringing one or more of its patents. Soon after, 
the NPE sends a request for royalty payments to the targeted company leaving the attached entity 
with three options: (1) stop using the technology (and incur switching costs if alternatives are 
available); (2) pay royalties to the NPE; or (3) face litigation.”  Stefania Fusco, Markets and 
Patent Enforcement: A Comparative Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in the United States 
and Europe, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 444 (2014). 
 116.  Awarding attorney’s fees may solve some but not all problems because defendants 
would still need to go through the court system.  Christian Helmers, Brian Love & Luke 
McDonagh, Is There a Patent Troll Problem in the U.K.?, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 509, 541–544 (2013) (arguing that the U.K. and the U.S. are similar in many respects 
but the U.K. experience fewer PAE activities because the U.K. system shifts the litigation costs 
onto the loser instead of each party paying for their own litigation costs). 
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of overlapping intellectual property rights.’”117  Patent thickets impose a 
cost upon innovators because innovators must check for possible 
infringements or need to guess and estimate the boundaries of numerous 
patents.118  PAEs, by indirectly encouraging patent thickets, increase the 
cost and diminish the likelihood of subsequent innovations.119 
“NPEs make innovation more expensive while, at the same time, 
creating a secondary market for inventors with an uncertain beneficial 
effect.”120  The overall theoretical impact of PAEs on patenting incentives 
and, by proxy, on innovation incentives remains unclear.121 Survey 
evidence has pointed out, however, that PAEs are not an efficient 
middleman first, because PAEs usually sue before issuing a license122 and 
second, because if a license is issued, it leads to no knowledge transfers,123 
or only marginal improvements to products.124  The overall impact of PAEs 
on innovation seems more negative than positive. 
The relationship between PAEs and patenting is intricate: PAEs need 
patents to thrive and they encourage patenting whether by providing a 
market for innovation or by creating the need for practicing entities to 
defend themselves.  Patents have proliferated as shown by Figure 1: The 
left axis shows the number of newly granted patents per year; the right axis 
shows the number of patent suit filed and the number patent suits involving 
 
 117.  Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 118.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 119.  Lemley et al., supra note 85, at 2125 (arguing that “[b]y increasing the costs of using 
technology, [NPEs] would . . . create deadweight, welfare-reducing loss by decreasing the use of 
patented technologies and the manufacture and sale of products using patented technologies. In 
addition, by increasing the costs of using patented technologies, they would reduce the use of 
those technologies in research and development (R&D) and in follow-on inventions and thereby 
reduce innovation.”). 
 120.  Fusco, supra note 115, at 449. 
 121.  Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L. 
J. 463 (2014) (presenting a stylized model that describe under which conditions NPEs promote 
innovation and benefit consumers and under which conditions they deter innovation and harm 
consumers; concluding that, under anecdotal evidence, NPEs are more likely to deter innovation 
and harm consumers). 
 122.  Feldman & Lemley, supra note 111, at 23. 
 123.  Feldman and Lemley argue that the traditional markers of knowledge transfer (technical 
knowledge, personnel transfer, and joint venture creation) are not exhibited by these relationships.  
Feldman & Lemley, supra note 111, at 25–28.  Their survey also shows that relationship with 
NPEs like universities also do not exhibit these markers.  Feldman & Lemley, supra note 112 at 
30–36. 
 124.  “100% of respondents in both the computer & other electronics category and the 
combined life sciences category reported that when licensing or settlement requests led to 
licenses, the technology they licensed resulted in adding new products or features 0-10% of the 
time.”  Feldman & Lemley, supra note 111, at 38. 
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Granted Patents Patent Suit Filings Patent Lawsuits Involving PAEs
PAEs.  Between 2004 and 2013, inventors have filed patents at a faster 
pace.  Figure 1 also shows that patent suits have increased at an even faster 
pace.  The portion of patent suits that involve NPEs has also increased 




The growth of patents and PAE activities is hard to disentangle.  On 
the one hand, a PAE can only file a suit after an inventor files a patent and 
sells it to them; hence, patent filings influence the likelihood of patent suits 
and PAE’s activities.  On the other hand, a PAE encourages patent filing 
for defensive purposes and by doing so provides innovators with financial 
alternatives.  The next section discusses how this can have an impact on 
startups and how innovation incentive affects their financing and VC 
funding.  It investigates in more detail the impact of PAEs on patenting 
activities. 
B. Spotting Innovation in the Software Industry 
PAEs have operated in many industries, but they have concentrated in 
the Information and Communication Technology (ICT).125  The ICT 
industry and in particular the software industry have been heavily impacted 
 
 125.  Bessen, Ford, and Meurer use industry codes (SIC) and estimate that 22 percent of NPE 
cases involved a defendant in the electronics industry, 15 percent in machinery and computer 
equipment, 14 percent in software, and 9 percent in communications between 1990 and 2010.  
Bessen, Ford & Meurer, supra note 27, at 29.  From surveys, Chien reports that 88 percent of IT 
VCs received demands of their portfolios as compared to biotechnology/pharmaceutical/medical 
device VCs of whom only 13 percent received demands.  Chien, supra note 93, at 11. 
Figure 1: Patents Granted and Patent Suits Filed between 2004 and 2013. 
(Source: USPTO; Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 
Patent Freedom) 
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by the rise of PAEs:126 since 2005, the majority of PAE suits have come 
from high-tech industry and about 42 percent of the litigated patents by 
PAEs come from the ICT industry.127 
PAEs can take advantage of the software industry’s characteristics: 
broad patents and patent abundance.  First, patents in the ICT industry and 
particularly in the software industry tend to be broad because software 
patents use functionality language (what something does) instead of 
descriptive language (what it is).128  A broad patent leads “to a lack of 
understanding of patent claims and, therefore, what constitutes 
infringement.”129  In some instance, patents could even overlap. 
Second, the abundance of patent increases the costs and decreases the 
benefits of patent searches for innovators.  This abundance leads to patent 
thickets,130 which complicates identifying the relevant patents.131  Figure 2 
shows on the left axis the number of newly granted patents for all USPTO 
categories and on the right axis the number of newly granted software 
patents.132  This figure shows that the number of software patents has 
increased at a faster rate than the total number of patents. 
 
 126.  “As many as 55% of all patent defendants and 82% of PAE (“patent troll”) defendants 
have been sued on the basis of a software patent.”  Colleen Chien & Aashish Karkhanis, Software 
Patents & Functional Claiming, Presentation to the 2/12/13 Software PTO Roundtable at SLS 
(2013) http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/software_ak_cc_sw.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 
2015). 
 127.  Patent Freedom, an organization that gathers data on NPE activities, reports in Exposure 
by Industry that in each year from 2005 to 2012, over 51 percent of NPE suits are from high-tech 
industry.  Aggregating the computer hardware, software, services, media and telecom, and semi-
conductors show that ICT accounted for 42 percent of litigated patents by NPEs.  https://www. 
patentfreedom.com/about-npes/industry/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 128.  Executive Office of the President, supra note 89, at 8. 
 129.  The GAO study, supra note 22, at 28–30. 
 130.  Timo Fischer & Philipp Ringler, The Coincidence of Patent Thickets – A Comparative 
Analysis, TECHNOVATION, December 2014, at Fig. 3 and Table 1. 
 131.  “[T]he sheer volume of patents makes searching for relevant patents before developing 
new products particularly difficult, especially for products that combine many patented 
technologies.”  The GAO study, supra note 22, at 30–31. 
 132.  Software patents include patents granted by USPTO under 14 different classifications 
according to the methodology provided by Stuart J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, The Use of 
Intellectual Property in Software: Implications for Open Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION: 
RESEARCHING A NEW PARADIGM 184 (Henry Chesbrough et al., eds., 2006): 324 (Electricity: 
Measuring and Testing), 345 (Computer Graphics Processing and Selective Visual Display 
Systems), 369 (Dynamic Information Storage or Retrieval), 700 (Data Processing: Generic 
Control Systems or Specific Applications), 701 (Data Processing: Vehicles, Navigation, and 
Relative Location), 703 (Data Processing: Structural Design, Modeling, Simulation, and 
Emulation), 707 (Data Processing: Database and File Management or Data Structures), 709 
(Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Multicomputer Data Transferring), 704 
(Data Processing: Speech Signal Processing, Linguistics, Language Translation, and Audio 
Compression/Decompression), 710 (Electrical Computers and Digital Data Processing Systems: 
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VCs invest in this patent ecosystem of broad, unclear, and abundant 
patents.  Not only patents lose value as an asset, they also lose their value 
as a signal: VCs will struggle more and more to assess patent value and 
innovation potential in the software industry.  VCs might wish to perform 
patent searches to assure that the companies in which they invest do not 
repeat patented innovation and do not infringe on existing invention.  
However, patent searches are expensive and having to perform searches 
nullifies some of the patent signaling value because its value can no longer 
be readily assessed at no cost. 
VCs might request that innovators perform searches before investing 
but innovators have little incentive to perform patent searches before 
innovating.  If an innovator encounters a relevant patent, during their 
search, on which they may infringe, then, during litigation, this knowledge 
may support a willful infringement theory and lead to higher damages.133  
Even if an innovator performs a search, she may struggle to find the patent 
owner because the PTO does not register transfers.  This is also true if 
PAEs hold these patents because, by definition, PAEs purchased their 
portfolio from innovators.134 
 
Input/Output), 711 (Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Memory), 713 
(Electrical Computers and Digital Processing Systems: Support), 715 (Data Processing: 
Presentation Processing of Document, Operator Interface Processing, and Screen Saver Display 
Processing), and 717 (Data Processing: Software Development, Installation, and Management). 
 133.  Id. 



















































Granted Patents Granted Software Patents
Figure 2: Patents Granted for Software and All Category Patents between 2004 and 2013. 
(Source: USPTO) 
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PAEs that file nuisance suits or leverage their portfolio135 can thrive in 
this software patent ecosystem because an alleged infringer is less likely to 
take a risk and challenge patents whose identities and boundaries are 
uncertain. 
In effect, software innovators are caught in a vicious circle: broad 
software patents lead to patent thickets; patent thickets lead to less pre-
invention patent searches; fewer searches increases infringement 
likelihood.  PAEs feed into this equation: they encourage patenting and 
broad software patent; and they increase search cost for patent owners.  
VCs also feed into this equation: They encourage patenting and selling 
these patents for scrap. 
For VCs, patents should become more of a shield against suits than a 
proof of innovativeness or even an asset to sell in case of failure.  The 
correlation and possibly the causation between patent lawsuits, PAE 
activities (observed in Figure 1) and patenting activities (observed in 
Figure 2) seems to point out that: with more patents comes more 
opportunity to file lawsuits; as PAEs accumulate more patents over the 
years, they have more opportunities to file lawsuits; and as they become 
more active, they create a higher cost on the system.  The relationship 
between PAEs and VCs lies through the patents they respectively purchase 
and sell, and through the companies they respectively sue and finance.  The 
next section attempts to answer how VCs have reacted to PAEs activities. 
IV. The Impact of Patent Assertion Entities on                    
Venture Capital Funds 
VCs and PAEs are repeat players targeting the same type of 
companies.  VCs traditionally invest in very small companies and PAEs 
target small as much as large companies, if not more.  One study reports 
that “companies with less than $10M of annual revenue represented at least 
55% of unique PAE defendants, bringing 26% of PAE defenses.”136  
 
 135.  As discussed previously, PAEs use three essential business models: litigation for large 
jury award; leveraging high litigation costs for quick and low-value settlement; large portfolio 
leveraging to induce licenses.  Lemley, et al., supra note 87, at 2126. 
 136.  Chien, supra note 112, at 471; Morton et al., supra note 121, found that in 2013 
defendants earning less than $10 million in revenues constituted 55 percent of unique defendants 
and 35 percent of total defendants.  Id. at Figure 3.  In 2015, Feldman et al., supra note 111, 
reported that in their sample of 102 companies, 71 percent of companies that received request had 
over $100 million in revenues.  Id. at 18; Chien, supra note 93, reports that from a survey of 307 
venture capital or investors and startups, 35 had received demands and 75 percent of the 
companies reported revenue under $10 million.  Id. at 10. NPEs do not spare small companies nor 
wait for them to become large in order to exercise pressure. 
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Unsurprisingly, a survey of 114 VC showed that “75% responded that 
NPEs had made demands of their portfolio.”137 
PAEs may target VC backed startups.  By definition, VC backed 
companies receive funds; hence, PAEs know that their demand can be 
honored.  PAEs can also strategically time their demand for further 
gains.138  Some startups’ funding events (e.g., obtaining seed money, doing 
later stage rounds of financing, or going through an IPO) receive 
publicity.139  Because litigations can impact their valuation,140 fund seeking 
companies will yield to PAE demands more easily –– even if they are 
unfunded. 
A. Empirical Evidence 
According to the previous argument, PAEs should impact VC 
activities.  In this section, I test the relationship between PAE activities, 
patenting activities, and VC activities at a macro level.  I collected data on: 
the number of patents granted annually sorted by category from the 
USPTO;141 patent suits from the yearly United States Courts statistics;142 
PAE activities from Patent Freedom;143 and venture capital funding from 
the Dow Jones database.144  Some of this data was used to graph Figure 1 
and Figure 2.  The data covers the period from 2004 to 2013. 
I test the following relationship: 
 
ܸܥ	ܣܿݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܮ݈݁݃ܽ	ܣܿݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ ൅ 	ߛܲܽݐ݁݊ݐ݅݊݃	ܣܿݐ݅ݒ݅ݐݕ ൅ 	ߜܧܿ݋݊݋݉݅ܿ	݄ܵ݋ܿ݇ݏ 
 
VC activities are represented by three variables: the number of 
software companies who receive funds; the total VC-funds invested in 
 
 137.  Chien, supra note 112, at 471. 
 138.  Morton et al., supra note 121, at 474–75. 
 139.  Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1320. 
 140.  Bessen, Ford, & Meurer, supra note 27, estimate that NPEs have led to a trillion dollars 
of lost wealth from NPEs suing public traded companies. 
 141.  Patent Counts By Class By Year January 1977—December 2014, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm (last visited 
May 28, 2015). 
 142. Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports (last visited May 28, 2015). 
 143.  RPX CORPORATION, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ (last visited 
May 28, 2015). 
 144.  VENTURESOURCE DOW JONES, https://www.venturesource.com (last visited May 28, 
2015).  The dataset contained 8,777 companies; after removing companies that did not have an 
industry affiliation, and did not have an amount funded, the dataset yield 15,800 transactions –– 
as some companies received more than one round of funding. 
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software companies; and the average VC-funds invested in software 
companies. 
Legal activities are represented by two variables: number of patent 
lawsuits; and the number of NPE lawsuits.  Patenting activity is represented 
by the number of patents granted. 
Since the period covers the financial crisis, financial shocks are likely.  
To control for these economic shocks, the estimation will include same 
variables for non-software companies.  The underlying assumption is that 
software and non-software companies were impacted in the same way by 
economic shocks. 
Since I would like to test whether PAE activities impacted VC 
funding, I must address the following two issues.  First, the discussion 
above highlighted that PAE activities, patenting, and VC funding show 
signs of simultaneity as well as feedback loops.  To address these potential 
endogeneity problems, the relationships are tested through fixed effect 
estimations, which focus on the impact of the change in the independent 
variables onto the change in the dependent variable.145  Second, I test the 
impact of the lagged legal activity and the lagged patenting activity because 
I hypothesize that VC activities are impacted by legal and patenting 
activities after these activities are observed. Thus, I hypothesis that: in year 
one, VCs observe the level of legal and patenting activity and fundraise;146 
and in year two, they invest these funds. 
The reason for using one-year lag for patenting activity is twofold.  
First, VC funds often base their funding upon patent applications and not 
necessary on patents granted because USPTO takes on average three years 
to grant patents at which point startups already need and receive funding.  
Looking at patent granted more than a year prior to funding would arguably 
not reflect the actual VC decisions.  Therefore, having older granted patents 
should not improve the results.147  Second, econometrically, adding more 
lagged software is problematic because of the sample size; it decreases the 
 
 145.  Fixed effect estimations focus on the change in a variable or more precisely on how a 
variable differs from its average value.  Using the first difference provides a similar result but 
since only eight years of data are available, fixed effect avoids losing a variable.  To avoid 
complicating the text unnecessarily, I write, for instance, that PAE activities impact VC activities 
whereas I am actually testing whether deviating from the mean PAE activity impacts deviating 
from the mean VC activity.  As such, ߙ is not computed because it is the average activity. 
 146.  VC funds invest their money after they raised the whole fund, which may take up to a 
year.  One study reports that the investment duration period, time between the first investment 
and the last investment, lasts between one to two years.  Douglas J. Cumming, The Determinants 
of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical Evidence, 79 J. BUS. 1083 (2006). 
 147.  Assuming that VCs base their funding decisions upon older patent portfolio, patent 
lawsuits may be.  In other words, the number of patents granted beyond the previous year may 
impact the number of software companies receiving financing. 
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accuracy of the results.  For completeness, I attempted to add more lag 
years for patents but it did not improve the results and the results did not 
lead to statistically significant effects. 
When the VC activity is measured by the number of software 
companies who receive funds, I expect this number to decrease as more 
lawsuits are filed and more PAEs are active because VC-backed software 
companies are prime targets and become less attractive as investments as 
compared to other opportunities that are not targeted by PAEs.  If VC funds 
are not deterred from investing, litigation activities may also increase the 
number of companies in which VC funds are invested because they want to 
diversify their risk and invest in more companies in case a lawsuit destroys 
their investment. 
When the VC activity is measured by the total VC-funds invested in 
software companies, I expect this number to either increase or decrease.  It 
may decrease if VC funds are deterred from investing in these companies 
because of the fear of losing their investments.  It may increase if they are 
not deterred because in spite of this “innovation tax” VCs still profit from 
their investment but must pay part of the profits to this innovation tax. 
When the VC activity is measured by the average VC-funds invested 
in software companies, I expect this number to either increase or decrease 
for the same reasons.  The results of these fixed effect estimates are 
presented in Table 1. 
In the first specification, the number of patent lawsuits in year one has 
a positive and statistically significant effect at the 10 percent level on the 
number of software companies in year two.  The number of patents granted 
in year one does not have a statistically significant effect on the number of 
software companies in year two. 
In the fourth specification, PAE filings in year one do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the number of software companies in year 
two.  The impact of patents granted in year one does not have a statistically 
significant effect. 
In the second specification, patent lawsuits in year one have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the total funds software companies 
receive in year two.  The number of software patents granted in year one 
has a negative and statistically significant effect the VC-funds software 
companies receive in year two. 
In the fifth specification, patent lawsuits and PAE filings in year one 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on total funds software 
companies receive in year two.  The number of software patents granted in 
year one has a negative but not statistically significant effect on the average 
funds software companies receive in year two. 
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  0.27   0.47 
Number of 
Observations 8 8 8 8 8 8 
R2 0.94 0.95 0.21 0.90 0.95 0.52 
* the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level 
** the coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level 
       
Table 1: Fixed Effects Regressions of the Macro-Level Impact of PAE Activities 
In the third specification, patent litigation in year one does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the average amount received by company 
in year two.  In the sixth specification, PAE activities in year one have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the average amount received 
by company in year two at the 10 percent level.  In these two 
specifications, the explanatory power of the fixed effects estimates is much 
lower than under other specifications. 
In general, lawsuits and PAE have impacted VC activities.  First, as 
expected, PAEs have a greater impact than lawsuits in general when 
comparing specifications 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6.  While the 
coefficients of these legal activities are consistent, they do not always 
produce statistically significant effects.  PAE activities impacted the total 
and average amount invested in software companies in a statistically 
significant way whereas lawsuits impacted the number of software 
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companies that received VC funds and the total amount VC funds invested 
in a statistically significant way. 
Second, these results are probative of some correlation but not 
causation.  PAE activities spur VC to invest more into software companies 
and this can be interpreted in two ways: On the one hand, VCs end up 
paying part of the rent raised by PAE and much like a tax, these rent is 
passed on to all market participants including investors like VCs; on the 
other hand, VCs may invest more into software companies because now if 
the companies fail, VCs can sell the patents to VC funds. 
However, I would argue that this second explanation does not hold 
because the number of software patent granted has a negative effect on the 
total and average amount received by VC-backed software companies 
(which is statistically significant in specification 2 and 6).  In other words, 
since granted software allows companies to protect themselves against 
demand, these companies require fewer funds.  This overall, supports the 
hypothesis that VCs infuse funds to pay for PAE demands.148 
In other words, VC funds seem to finance the litigious activities of 
their investments.  The extra funds invested might also be later transferred 
to PAEs.  Not only do VC funds indirectly pay a part of the PAE burden, 
they act like an insurance company by spreading the risk of PAE activities 
across all their investments and increasing the pool of companies in which 
they invest. 
The data provides some level of detail about who receive the VC 
funds: the funds can be divided according to the timing to the investment or 
investment rounds: seed round, first round, second round, and later round.  
This nomenclature parallels the development stages during which the 
company fundraises.  After dividing the data according to the investment 
stage and focusing on PAE activities, the relationship between the variables 
are further investigated.  Table 2 summarizes the results of these 
investigations. 
The seed round results show that PAE activities in year one do not 
have a statistically significant effect on VC behavior in year two at the seed 
round.  VC funds may not be reacting to PAE activities at the seed round 
because PAE do not focus on seed companies.  Seed software startups 
receive on average $630,000 (and non-software seed startups receive 
$780,000) as compared to companies in the first round who receive on 
average $4 million (and $5.5 million respectively), in the second round 
who receive $6.2 million (and $7.9 million respectively), in the later stages 
 
 148.  VC funds invest fewer funds because patents can be used as shield against litigation and 
hence patent protection decreases the VC investment’s exposure to suits whereas if patents were 
valuable assets, as more patents are granted, VC should invest more. 
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who receive $8.5 million (and $11.5 million respectively).  Thus, the 
relatively small amount that seed startups receive may not attract PAEs and 
explains why their activity does not have a statistically significant effect on 
VC funding activities. 
The first round results show that PAE activities only have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the total amount invested by VC into 
software companies.  Taking all three results together seems to imply that 
overall VCs have invested more money because of PAE activities but the 
increase per company is only marginal.  From year to year, the average 
amount software companies receive at the seed stage has oscillated around 
the $4 million without much deviation. 
The second round results show that PAE activities in year one had a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the change in the total amount 
invested by VC into software companies in year two and on the total 
amount invested by VC into software companies in year two; but, it did not 
have a statistically significant effect on the average amount invested by VC 
into software companies in year two. 
These results seem to imply that VCs have increased the amount they 
invest overall in companies at the second round of financing but also they 
have invested in more companies at this investment round.  These results 
support that VC funds seem to diversify their risk while paying part of the 
innovation tax. 
The later round results show that the change in PAE activities in year 
one had a positive and statistically significant effect on all three dependent 
variables in year two.  These correlations support the assertion that VC 
funds observed PAE activities and reacted in response to their increased 
activities by increasing the amount invested overall and on average as well 
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 VC activities have been most affected by PAE activities in the second 
and later round the most.  First, from a cost benefit analysis standpoint, 
PAEs may focus their activities where they may profit the most.  PAEs 
may have targeted companies that are in later rounds of fundraising 
because these companies receive more funds and can afford to pay 
demands.  These companies also have more (financial backing) to lose; 
hence, they may be more willing to settle.  If PAEs had targeted seed and 
first stage startups who cannot defend themselves or do not know how, the 
effect has not been statistically significant at the macro level.  Anecdotal 
evidence discussed above shows that PAEs have made demands from all 
companies; hence, PAEs may have had a disparate effect. 
Second and late stage startups are older startups, which are more 
likely to have been granted a patent.  Thus, they are more likely to bse able 
to defend themselves against demands.  VC funds could have perceived 
these type of companies as safer investments and decide to invest more into 
these later stage ventures in year two once they observe more PAE 
activities in year one. 
Some VCs specialize in rounds and only invest in seed or late stage 
startups whereas others invest in a balanced portfolio.  Since I cannot 
control for the origin of the funding, it is impossible to determine whether 
PAEs may have led to a shift in the behavior for VCs with a balance 
portfolio.149 
Over the period, VC funds have invested more in later stage startups 
overall and on average (a 53 percent increase in the average amount 
received by later stage software companies and 16 percent increase for non-
software companies).  In comparison, between 2005 and 2012, seed 
startups received fewer funds on average (a 7 percent decrease in the 
average amount received by software startups and 24 percent for non-
software startups). 
This increase may also be due to the financial crisis.  The non-
software VC investment variables all have a statistically significant effect 
on the dependent variables for the late stage estimations.  More mature 
companies may have received more funds during the period because they 
were viewed as more likely to survive. 
Once more, VC funds do not seem to invest more because PAEs 
purchase patents: the number of granted patents by the USPTO has a 
negative effect on VCs investment when statistically significant.  This 
 
 149.  Round specialized VCs may no change their behavior without important switching cost 
linked to the partnership agreement when the VC was set up. 
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supports the notion that VC funds have valorized patents as a mean to 
protect against PAE activities. 
However, these estimations have limitations.  I can only use eight 
years of macro-level data.  Data on individual companies and the PAE 
demands they receive may help further answer these questions particularly 
because numerous demands may not take the form of a suit.  As such, a 
micro-level investigation may provide a better understanding of VC 
behavior in the face of PAE demands. 
Even with these limitations, these estimations support the notion that 
VC funds may have impacted their financing behavior because of PAE 
activities.  Further investigations of these issues may be required to draw a 
more accurate conclusion about the actual micro level impact. 
B. What can VCs do? 
PAEs are active in the software and tech industry and VCs invest in 
these industries.150  As repeat players, VCs need be aware of PAEs and 
adjust their business model accordingly151 because small companies and 
startups hardly benefit from PAEs through patent sales.152  The VC 
adjustments come at three stages: preinvestment, during investment, and 
post-investment. 
Preinvestment VCs may wish to stop valorizing patent as signal.  This 
approach feeds into the PAE problem.  Since innovators who patent are 
more likely to receive funds, this added incentive leads to more patents, 
which may later be sold to PAEs.  More patents also increase the likelihood 
of patent thickets, where PAEs thrive. 
VCs need to realign their cultural approach to patents and possibly 
more in line with startup innovators.  “While most surveyed VCs were 
positive about patents, startup survey respondents tended to express more 
anti-patent sentiments.”153  VCs need not rely on patents for investing 
because they can use other metrics or tools.  In the software industry, VCs 
have used software downloads, network size, and other performance 
measures to invest.154  VCs should eliminate their reliance on patents 
 
 150.  From 66 VC funds, 88 percent responded that PAEs made demands of companies in 
their portfolios.  Chien, supra note 112, at 471–72. 
 151.  Some market participants have expressed certainties about PAE demands showing that 
companies and VCs are aware of their presence.  Chien, supra note 112, at Table 1. 
 152.  Larger companies benefit from selling their patents to PAE as “50% of PAE patents 
come from companies with under $200M in annual revenue.”  Chien, supra note 112, at 469. 
 153.  Chien, supra note 93, at 21–22. 
 154.  See Mario Schaarschmidt & Harold von Kortzfleisch, Examining Investment Strategies 
of Venture Capitalists in Open Source Software, 11 INT’L J. INNOVATION AND TECH. 
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altogether.  The information gained through using patents is only marginal 
from the information a VC could gain through a nondisclosure agreement 
with a fund-seeking venture.  Furthermore, they may pass by socially and 
privately efficient innovation that may not be patentable. 
Pre-investment, VCs should create an environment where PAE 
demands should not become taboo.  A rational VC expects PAE demands 
and accounts for them ex-ante.  By penalizing fund-seeking companies if 
they receive PAE demands, VCs encourage companies to hide these 
demand, which lead to further information asymmetries and also 
companies to yield to PAE demands to hide them.  In other words, VCs 
indirectly incentivize their companies to yield to demands.  Without precise 
information, VCs will spread the cost of PAEs over its entire portfolio and 
act as insurance companies for their portfolio innovative startups.155  This 
phenomenon spreads the PAE innovation tax beyond the concerned 
company and industry. 
Once they have invested, VCs can help their startups to anticipate 
PAE demands.  First, VCs can encourage their portfolio companies to 
exercise more caution to perform patent searches at the onset.  VC backed 
companies already perform more patent searches than the general 
population of companies.156  In the IT industry, VCs need to double their 
efforts: even though PAEs are more active in ICT, IT innovators perform 
fewer patent searches than other industries;157 and VC-backed companies 
only perform marginally more patent searches than non-VC backed 
companies.158 
 
MANAGEMENT 1 (2014).  The authors discuss how VCs have invested in Open Source Software. 
Id.  They discuss how by definition those VCs do not rely on intellectual property to profit but 
instead of other business model (e.g., sale of complementary services) and have relied on other 
performance indicators and methods to select ventures. Id. 
 155.  In equilibrium, since VCs expect a certain level of PAE demands, they have already 
adjusted on all their offers to all their ventures.  Because these costs remain inaccurate without 
disclosure between entrepreneurs and VCs, the venture capitals will on average overestimate the 
demand than underestimate. Thus, this PAE tax affects venture more than necessary because of 
these information asymmetries.  As a tax, PAEs deter investments in seemingly lower-innovative-
potential ventures because high-innovative-potential ventures remain attractive investments. 
 156.  “A substantial share of the respondents to this question reported regularly doing patent 
searches. . . .  Among the venture-backed sample, searching was substantially more common.”  
Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1321. 
 157.  Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1321.  The authors found that nine in ten biotechnology 
and medical devices companies perform patent searches whereas only six in ten IT companies 
and three in ten software companies amongst VC backed companies.  Id. 
 158.  “[S]lightly less than one-quarter of software companies reported doing regular patent 
searches . . . [and] nearly three in ten venture-backed software startups.”  Id.  See GAO Study, 
supra note 22, at 30 (anecdotally comparing the search cost technology industry and 
pharmaceutical industry). 
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VCs need to further encourage patent searches as best practices; but, 
VCs should also request these patent searches to be performed as soon as 
possible.159  Patent searches have a real cost, which will partially be passed 
on to innovation users and will decrease the overall innovation value.  
However, search costs avoid larger litigation costs later.  Furthermore, 
patent searches have positive externalities because companies do not 
inefficiently repeat existing research: If an innovation exists, the startup can 
try to obtain a license.  These best practices, once implemented, benefit 
startups now and in the future.160 
Aside from avoiding demands, VCs can play a role in countervailing 
PAE unreasonable demands.  As an industry repeat player, VCs know the 
reputation of PAEs better than new innovators; hence, they can mentor 
innovators to deal with these demands.161 
VCs value patents as a shield against demands.  Individual rationality 
dictates that VCs push for patenting instead of trade secret because trade 
secrets do not protect them against attacks.162  However, having a software 
patent does not protect against PAE demands because the PAE-offensive 
and the startup-defensive patents still need to be compared, contrasted, and 
litigated in court.  PAEs’ second and third business model gamble on 
startups being cash-strapped and thus challenge patents in court –– 
regardless of the claim validity. 
Post-investment, VCs should, however, avoid selling their portfolio 
companies’ patents to PAEs.  The majority of startups, particularly 
software startups, do not have patents; if they do, they only sell them 
 
 159.  Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1322-23.  The authors discuss the timing of the patent 
search and argue that companies “put off costly searching until they are more certain of the 
economic value of a technology.”  Id.  A startup may need to perform some research before they 
can identify the problems needing solving; hence, a patent search many be impossible until later 
in the innovation process.  Id. 
 160.  Annalisa Croce, José Martí & Samuele Murtinu, The Impact of Venture Capital on the 
Productivity Growth of European Entrepreneurial Firms: ‘Screening’ or ‘Value added’ Effect?, 
28 J. BUS. VENTURING 489 (2013) empirically test and find that VC-backed companies have 
higher level of productivity than comparable non-VC backed companies once VC invest and that 
these VC investments have a long term effect on the company’s productivity: the VC exit has no 
negative impact on labor, capital, and total factor productivity.  Id.  They conclude that VCs have 
an imprinting effect (performance persistence after the exit) because VCs provide value-adding 
services like coaching and mentoring.  Id. 
 161.  Chien describes in Appendix C a number of patent defense service providers and 
offerings and as repeat players, VCs are better placed to encourage the user of these services.  
Chien, supra note 93, at 52 app. c. 
 162.  Patents also provide some monopoly power for their portfolio companies but these 
startups can find it too costly to enforce their own patents. 
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during transition or distressful times.163  This decision to refuse to sell to 
PAEs is socially and individually rational: in the future, their portfolio 
companies are likely to receive demand from PAEs.  And because VCs 
operate in a given industry, the patents they sell to PAEs can come back 
and haunt them. 
VCs can benefit from keeping the patents of their failed companies to 
pass on to future startups, or putting them into a patent pool on behalf of 
their portfolio companies, or selling them to practicing entities.  For 
instance, Google has recently attempted to purchase the patents of 
distressed companies and innovators to circumvent them selling to PAEs 
and reappearing as a threat later.164 
V. Conclusion 
PAEs’ demands do not create the same impact on larger companies as 
they do on smaller ones.165  These demands unsettle the operation of small 
companies, whose responses vary from product changes to fighting the 
issues in court.166  VC funds operate within the realm of these small 
companies.  They have a chance to diminish the impact of PAEs. 
Even though a company’s profit potential is hard to assess ex-ante, 
investors must stop putting such an emphasis on patents in their decision-
making.  Such emphasis becomes detrimental to innovation because 
innovators are over-incentivized to invest in patents instead of investing in 
innovations. 
These issues are exacerbated in the software industry.  VC funds and 
PAEs have constant run-ins.  VCs pressure their portfolio companies to 
patent, which feeds even further into the PAE problem: More patenting 
leads to more patent thickets and more patenting opens the door to more 
patents available for sale to PAEs if the startup fails.  Therefore, VCs 
indirectly put their future investment at a competitive disadvantage. 
 
 
 163.  Chien, supra note 93, at 479–80.  Note that selling should be distinguished from 
monetizing via licensing here because a previous OECD research found that smaller and larger 
companies had a higher propensity to license than medium size companies as measured by 
employees.  Zuniga, supra note 94, at 13 tbl.2.  However, age of the companies did not seem to 
play an important factor.  Id. at 15 tbl.6. 
 164.  Allen Lo, Announcing the Patent Purchase Promotion, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG 
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com.es/2015/04/announcing-patent-purchase-
promotion.html. 
 165.  Chien explains that “The smaller the company, the less able it was to absorb the impact 
of a lawsuit without a significant impact: the smallest companies reported the highest rate, while 
companies over $100M in revenue reported no impact from troll suits, even though they were 
sued at a much higher frequency than small companies in the sample.”  Chien, supra note 112, at 
475. 
 166.  Chien, supra note 112, at 473 tbl.1. 
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The software industry lends itself to the proliferation of PAEs.  Their 
proliferation makes assessing the value of innovations even more difficult.  
As a result, VC fund activities have been in part affected by PAE activities 
and VCs are paying for the activities of PAEs.  In the future, VCs should 
aim to decrease the chances of having to respond to PAEs’ demands.  
 
 
